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ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION 
IN MEXICO 
Karen E. Jones 
From Desperation to Liberalization 
Mexico shocked financial markets around 
the world on August 14, 1982, when it default-
ed from payment on its skyrocketing public 
debt. This delinquency caused a surge of capi-
tal flight, and coupled with high inflation rates 
and interest rates caused a further decline in 
economic growth. The dire state of the econo-
my necessitated dramatic change. Like past 
Mexican leaders, President Lopez Portillo react-
ed by increasing the economic control of the 
federal government. He nationalized the bank-
ing industry which was made up of sixty com-
mercial banks and consolidated them into eigh-
teen government operated banks. 
When Miguel de Ia Madrid took office as 
President on December 1, 1982, he recognized 
the failure of the inwardly focused economic 
strategy and initiated liberalization of Mexican 
markets. He realized that a significant increase 
in foreign investment and return of capital l 
flight would be necessary to improve the dread-
ful economic conditions in Mexico. He under-
stood that in order to attract investment, 
Mexican markets would need to become more 
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stable and less constrained by regulation. In 
response, he progressively changed laws to open 
trade to foreign competition and began reduc-
ing the role of the public sector in the domes-
tic economy. 
During de Ia Madrid's six year term as 
President, tariffs declined from a maximum of 
100 percent to a maximum of 20 percent when 
he left office in 1988. Mexico also saw nonpe-
troleum exports rise from $4.4 billion to $14 
billion, and witnessed a reduction in the num-
ber of government-owned enterprises from 
1,155 in 1982 to fewer than 400 in 1988. 
(Secretariat of Finance, p. 8) However, 
although the de Ia Madrid administration may 
now be favorably regarded for the structural 
change it initiated, the immediate reactions 
were unfavorable due to its failure to deliver 
economic growth and its reluctance to deal 
with inflation until Madrid's last year in office. 
Carlos Salinas followed de la Madrid as the 
next PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) 
President on December 1, 1988. He received 
50.4 percent of the vote, yielding him just 
enough to keep the PRI, the ruling party in 
Mexico since 1929, in power for another six 
years. The PRI's waning percentage indicated 
the dissatisfaction the Mexican people felt with 
the social and economic conditions in Mexico. 
President Salinas envisioned further liberaliza-
tion of the economy as a means to help stabi-
lize and generate growth. He immediately 
determined his goals and methods of imple-
mentation. In a four-page advertisement in var-
ious United States newspapers in January 1989, 
he listed his goals as: 
(1) Maintaining the fight against inflation; 
(2) Encouraging entrepreneurial invest-
ment; 
(3) Continuing privatization and deregula-
tion; 
(4) Proceeding with the opening up of the 
economy. 
(Wall Street Journal, January 23, 1989, 
pp. B7-B10) 
Over the last four years, Salinas has 
achieved all four goals. Inflation has declined 
from over fifty percent in 1987 to under twen-
ty percent in 1991. The reduction of inflation 
can be attributed to the stabilization of the 
economy which was achieved through success-
ful debt restructuring and through the suc-
cessful divestiture process which began in 1983. 
In addition, the Economic Solidarity Pact, 
introduced during the Madrid administration, 
also contributed to the reduction in inflation. 
In September 1989, an agreement con-
cerning Mexico's national debt was negotiated 
with creditors and implemented over the next 
few months. It applied to approximately $45.8 
billion worth of debt, equal to approximately 
one-half of Mexico's total debt, owed mainly to 
foreign commercial banks. Total monetary 
transfers abroad (including amortization pay-
ments) subsequently declined by $4 billion per 
year. This reduction in payments was achieved 
through lengthened maturity of the debt, net 
interest reductions, and new money. (Tandon, 
chap. 15, p. 4) Over $9 billion in domestic flight 
capital has returned to Mexico since the debt 
restructuring. In addition, the Salinas admin-
istration has privatized over 150 government-
owned companies and has continued to open 
up the economy to foreign competition. 
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The Worldwide Shift to Privatization 
Great Britain, France, Italy, Argentina, 
Chile, Mexico, and the Eastern Bloc countries 
are just a few examples of nations that have pri-
vatized formerly government -owned enterpris-
es over the last ten years. Great Britain priva-
tized British Airways, National Freight, and its 
utilities industries as well as forty-three other 
large companies. Chile has transformed its for-
merly socialistic economy to a market-based 
economy. It privatized over 360 state compa-
nies, replaced social security with privately 
owned pension funds, and privatized its health 
care system. Why the sudden fascination with 
privatization? In an essay entitled "Liberaliza-
tion, Integration, and Privatization," Ira 
Lieberman asserted that the need for privatiza-
tion in Latin America and most Eastern 
European countries arose from the debt crisis 
which plagued these regions for almost a 
decade. However, the interesting question is 
not why they decided to privatize, but whether 
or not privatization has helped to solve the eco-
nomic difficulties these countries were experi-
encing. In a World Bank study which analyzed 
the outcome of privatization for twelve formerly 
government-owned enterprises from Chile, 
Malaysia, Mexico, and the U.K., eleven of the 
twelve newly divested firms produced a net 
increase in income. The gains in wealth, accord-
ing to this study, resulted from higher invest-
ment, managerial innovation, better pricing of 
the firm's services, and shedding of surplus 
workers. (Tandon, chap. 15, p. 10) 
The Divestiture Process in Mexico 
Reorganization of state-owned enterpris-
es (SOEs) was a main element in Mexico's plan 
to reduce government debt and stabilize the 
economy. Administrators believed that elimi-
nating SOEs would help to cut government 
expenditures and thus help reduce the massive 
deficit. Mexico has utilized four types of pub-
lic sector reorganization: sale to the private sec-
tor, liquidation, merger with other public sec-
tor enterprises, and transfer of ownership to 
regional or municipal authorities. The last two 
are not modes of privatization, but like privati-
zation transfer power away from the federal 
government. The method for reorganization 
was determined according to each company's 
status at the time of divestiture. Non-priority 
and non-strategic companies were sold to the 
private sector. Liquidation was implemented in 
companies that lacked economic viability, while 
other companies were merged in order to 
improve the distribution of their resources 
prior to privatization. Companies of regional or 
local importance, related to development pro-
grams, were transferred to state and local gov-
ernments. Liquidation was the method used 
most frequently in the early phases of the 
divestiture program (1983-1988) while sales to 
the private sector have been the most signifi-
cant method utilized since 1989. (Tandon, 
chap. 15, p. 6) 
A proposal by the coordinating agency 
(e.g. The Secretary of Agriculture) to the 
Commission Intersecretarial de Casto 
Financiamento is the first step in the divesti-
ture process. Only non-strategic and non-pri-
ority companies are proposed for divestiture, or 
"disincorporation" as it is called in Mexico. 
Companies considered "strategic" or "priority" 
are not considered for divestiture. 1 The 
Commission analyzes all proposals for non-
strategic and non-priority companies and 
decides on the appropriate form of divestiture: 
liquidation, merger, transfer, or sale. Once the 
form of action is determined, an agent bank, 
one of the eighteen commercial banks in 
Mexico, is appointed based on its experience and 
workload. If a sale is decided upon, the agent 
bank designs a sales strategy, proposes general 
guidelines, decides on a date of notification to 
prospective buyers, and publishes an executive 
summary and a prospectus that contains finan-
cial statements, credit history, and the com-
mercial situation of the company for sale. 
The next step in the privatization process 
is a technical financial assessment performed 
by the agent bank which indicates a reference 
price for the firm; however, the price for which 
the company is actually sold depends upon 
1For example, Pemex, Mexico's giant petroleum manu-
facturer. 
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market conditions. The agent bank then 
receives the offers in the presence of a public 
notary. It decides the winner based mainly upon 
the highest bid, but also considers the prospec-
tus investment plans and payment conditions. 
The final authorization of the sale is determined 
by the Finance Secretariat. Proceeds from the 
sale are deposited in the Federal Treasury. 
(Secretariat of Finance, pp. 11-14) 
Despite the fact that more than 200,000 
Mexicans are estimated to have lost their jobs 
due to the divestiture program, there has been 
little opposition from organized labor thus far. 
Authorities attribute this to the provisions that 
were designed to protect workers. For exam-
ple, if resistance to a privatization develops, a 
union can acquire the company being sold by 
matching the highest bid. Between the period 
1989-91, sixteen SOEs were sold to unions in 
this manner. Furthermore, employees are 
sometimes sold shares in the company after the 
divestiture in order to encourage cooperation. 
During the privatization of Telmex (discussed 
in detail later in this essay), the Telmex union 
was sold 4.4 percent of the company's shares for 
$325 million. As of April 1992 these shares 
were worth $1.37 billion or almost 4.6 times 
their purchased value. In addition, buyers are 
forewarned that layoffs are not to occur. In fact, 
in most cases layoffs have not occurred follow-
ing privatization. (Tandon, chap. 15,p. 10) 
Another factor which helped to gain the 
vital support of organized labor during the pri-
vatization process was the promotion of the 
program by the Salinas Administration. 
President Salinas has reminded the public on 
his weekly tours of the countryside that the 
money gained from the sales of these compa-
nies is being used to build schools, install elec-
tricity, and pipe water into rural communities. 
This reinforces the link in the people's minds 
between privatization and progress. 
The Privatization of Aeromexico 
The 1,100 privatizations which have been 
completed in Mexico over the last ten years have 
included a wide range of corporations, from 
small manufacturing companies to the nation's 
most important banks. Aero mexico, one of the 
three major Mexican airlines, was nationalized 
during a pilots' strike in 1959. Ironically, in April 
1988 during a ground workers ' strike, the 
Mexican Government pushed the firm into bank-
ruptcy and liquidated all its contracts. Soon 
after, it sold the firm to a private buyer. The sale 
of Aeromexico was a financial success. After 
experiencing net losses for three decades before 
its privatization, the airline turned a small prof-
it (less than one percent of sales) after only one 
year in private hands. Although Aeromexico lost 
money overall in 1991, the losses were substan-
tially smaller than the net losses suffered in 
1985-1987. (Tandon, chap. 17, p. 10) 
Was Aeromexico 's turnaround a direct 
result of privatization? Several factors reveal 
that an increase in profitability could not have 
been achieved without privatization. First, 
since the privatization of Aeromexico, labor 
costs have been sharply reduced. These reduc-
tions were induced by both a significant down-
sizing of the labor force as well as by a ten per-
cent cut in airline workers ' salaries. These 
cost-saving measures could not have occurred 
without the declaration of bankruptcy, liquida-
tion, and sale to private investors. Under 
Mexican law, workers are entitled to job secu-
rity, so it is extremely difficult for companies to 
terminate employees even if the company no 
longer needs them. However, if a company files 
bankruptcy, its workers can be discharged. In 
April 1988 after filing bankruptcy, Aeromexico 
fired all of its workers. It closed operations until 
early May, and then began flying ten routes with 
five aircraft and a significantly reduced staff. 
After witnessing success at this reduced 
staff level, the Mexican Government announced 
its decision to privatize the airline. On 
September 7, the government created a new 
company from Aeromexico, called Aerovias de 
Mexico, with a capital stock of 100 million 
pesos. This new airline quickly reached con-
tractual agreements with its workers. On 
September 26, the government offered poten-
tial buyers of the airline two options, both of 
which specified a minimum price. This proce-
dure differed from the majority of Mexico's pri-
vatizations not only because it was a sale of 
assets, as opposed to a sale of an ongoing com-
pany, but also because there was a pre-
announced minimum price. The winning bid 
came from a consortium of investors under the 
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name of Dictum, S.A. de C.V. The airline began 
operating as a private company at the end of 
November 1988 under the name of Aeromexico. 
The most notable changes since the sale 
are a reduced workforce, a dramatically small-
er capital stock, and an increase in overall labor 
productivity. The change in capital stock 
results from the fact that most of the fleet is 
now leased, not owned. In 1987, Aeromexico 
owned 24 aircraft and leased 19; but in 1991, 
only 2 aircraft were owned while 43 were leased. 
The increased reliance on leasing has caused 
higher rental unit costs. However, total unit 
costs have fallen because of the significantly 
lower labor costs. The reduction in the size of 
the workforce combined with new pay reduc-
tions has nearly doubled labor productivity fol-
lowing divestiture. 
Although it is difficult to assess the real 
winners and losers in the transformation of 
Aeromexico, the Mexican government gained 
the most overall. Not only did it sell a firm that 
had been incurring losses for more than thirty 
years , but it will collect from the company 
approximately $2.12 billion in present value tax 
revenues over the life of the company. In addi-
tion, domestic and foreign shareholders gained 
due to the increased profitability of the compa-
ny. However, domestic and foreign consumers 
lost due to an increase in flight prices following 
privatization. The airline's employees lost as 
well due to the substantial reduction in the size 
of the workforce and the ten percent decrease 
in salaries. Overall welfare is estimated to have 
risen by $2.28 billion, mainly stemming from 
the labor force reductions allowed after bank-
ruptcy was declared. (Tandon, chap. 17, p. 31) 
Effects of Divestiture at Telefonos de 
Mexico(Telmex) 
Another example of privatization in 
Mexico which resulted in increased profitabili-
ty was Telmex, one of the largest telephone 
companies in the developing world. During his 
1988 Presidential campaign, Carlos Salinas 
announced his intention to privatize Telmex. 
At this time the government owned 56 percent 
of the company's stock, while the remaining 44 
percent was privately owned. In September 
1989 it was announced that the capital of the 
company was going to be restructured so that 
only 40 percent of the shares would have vot-
ing rights. The government then offered for 
sale 51 percent of the voting stock, or 20.4 per-
cent of the total stock. Bids were received in 
November 1990, and the sale was finalized in 
December to Southwestern Bell, France 
Telecom, and Grupo Carso, a Mexican holding 
company controlled by Carlos Flynn, a promi-
nent businessman. 
The profitability of Telmex has increased 
substantially since its sale in late 1990; howev-
er, unlike Aero mexico it was not a direct result 
of privatization. Rather, the increase in prof-
itability resulted from changes in government 
regulations since 1988. The most significant 
change in regulation was the massive increas-
es in installation and rental charges as well as 
price increases on local, domestic, and inter-
national calls that the government allowed after 
January 1, 1988. In a case study published by 
the World Bank, Pankaj Tandon argues that "it 
is tempting to assume that the jump in profits 
emerged from productivity and efficiency 
improvements; however, .. .the primary source 
behind the upward trend in profitability is revi-
sions in output prices in 1988 which were fol-
lowed by further revisions in 1990." (Tandon, 
chap. 16, p. 1) 
Telemex's price increases in 1988 and 1990 
resulted in a quadrupling in its stock price from 
1988 to 1992. In addition, labor productivity 
has improved since 1988, rising by 15 percent 
in 199l.Tandon contends that "part of the 
improvement can be attributed to the prospect 
and the realization of privatization." (Tandon, 
chap. 16, p. 29) The increase in labor produc-
tivity comes from the improvement in labor 
relations since 1988. The telephone workers' 
union has supported the sale of the company 
ever since the initial announcement in 1988. 
An April 1989 agreement with the union 
replaced fifty-seven different contracts with a 
single one to be negotiated each year. It also 
allowed greater labor mobility and developed 
criteria which when satisfied would permit 
employee layoffs. Fiscal revenues were essen-
tially unchanged; reductions in taxes on Telmex 
services have been offset by increases in corpo-
rate income tax payments. However, faced with 
a rise in prices (greater than the fall in tax rates 
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on Telemex services), consumers are worse off 
by $33 billion. 
Although Tandon argues that Telmex's 
increased profitability was not a result of pri-
vatization, he contends that the disincorpora-
tion of Telmex did contribute to the transfor-
mation of the Mexican economy, also known as 
the "Mexican Economic Miracle." It did so by 
first allowing the government to use the pro-
ceeds of the sale($10 billion) to retire a portion 
of the national debt, the reduction of which 
restored credibility to Mexico in world financial 
markets. Second, the Telmex sale attracted over 
$6 billion in capital inflows in a period of a year 
and a half. And finally, as Tandon argues, 
Telmex was a catalyst for the highly successful 
privatizations that followed. (Tandon, chap. 16, 
pp. 16-35) 
Results of Privatization of Mexico's 
Eighteen Nationalized Banks 
Like the privatizations of Aeromexico and 
Telmex, the sales of the eighteen nationalized 
Mexican banks were a terrific success overall. 
The sales raised more than $12 million for the 
government. This figure represents more than 
half of all the revenues realized from privatiza-
tions completed under the Salinas administra-
tion. The sales began in June 1991 and were 
completed in July 1992 with the sale of Banco 
del Centro(Bancen). The bidding grew more 
intense as the program neared completion. 
Price/book ratios-that is, the price at which 
the company was sold divided by the estimated 
book value of the company before the sale-
averaged 3.23 for the first six sales, whereas the 
average rose to 4.22 for the last six banks sold. 
Bancen, the final bank to be privatized and the 
smallest of all the banks as measured by assets, 
was sold for $279 million, which was 4.65 times 
its book value. ("Privatizations Transform 
Mexican Banking System," p. 3) 
The Mexican financial system has changed 
dramatically since the advent of the Salinas 
administration. Prior to the bank privatiza-
tions, the Mexican government controlled near-
ly all of the country's banking resources. 
Although ownership of the country's banks has 
been transfered to private hands, control of the 
banking system remains concentrated in a few 
large banks. Currently, Banamex and 
Bancomer, two of the country's eight financial 
groups that operate in the Bolsa (the Mexican 
stock market) control 67 percent of the assets, 
69 percent of the investments in other compa-
nies, and earn 71 percent of the profits of all the 
financial groups combined. All together total 
assets of the eight groups that operate in the 
Bolsa measured $100 million at the end of the 
first quarter of 1992, which is approximately 
equal to 31 percent of Mexico's GDP. (Notimex 
Mexican News Service, July 8, 1992) However, 
although control over the financial system 
remains centralized, since the privatization of 
the eighteen national banks the number of 
shareholders in Mexican banks has increased 
from 8,000 to 130,000. So, although power 
remains concentrated the number of partici-
pants in the banking system has risen since pri-
vatization. 
Before initiating privatization of its eigh-
teen nationalized banks, the Mexican govern-
ment reformed its banking regulations. 
President and CEO of First Boston Group, John 
M. Hennessy, has attributed the overall success 
of the bank privatizations to these regulatory 
reforms, which provided for a single regulator 
for all Mexican banks. The Mexican system con-
trasts sharply with that in the United States, 
where banks can be subject to regulation by the 
Federal Reserve Bank, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation(FDIC), the Comptroller 
of the Currency, and state regulatory authori-
ties. Besides the duplication in duties that these 
regulators often perform, U.S. banks often 
encounter conflicting advice depending on the 
regulatory source. With a single regulatory 
authority, the Mexican banking system will 
avoid such problems. 
Another attractive feature of the recent 
Mexican bank reform is that it allows for the 
formation of "universal banks." In addition to 
banking services, these banks will be able to 
offer securities brokerage services, leasing, fac-
toring, insurance, and mutual funds, in addi-
tion to banking services. The reform also added 
a tough system to review and control the qual-
ity of banks' loan portfolios. Since the reform 
of the system, more than $4 billion in flight 
capital has returned to Mexico, reflecting 
investor confidence in the new financial system. 
(Hennessy, p. 13) 
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Lessons Learned From the 
Privatization Program 
Jacques Rogozinski, director-in-chief of 
Mexico's Office for Privatization of State Owned 
Enterprises, recently summarized a set of gen-
eral principles for successful privatization of 
state-run industries that Mexico learned 
through its experience. First, he stressed that 
small companies should be privatized in the 
beginnirtg stages of the process, leaving the 
larger, more important enterprises until the 
end. This allows the country to correct any 
problems that arise during the process and per-
fect the whole program by the time it sells, for 
example, "the most important bank in the 
country." Secondly, Rogozinski suggested that 
officials should wait to announce plans to pri-
vatize a firm until it is ready to enter the sales 
process. An early announcement often invites 
criticism from the press, which can create neg-
ative feelings about the firm being sold, and 
could lower the market value of the firm. 
However, once plans are announced, he stressed 
the importance of keeping the public well 
informed about the entire sales process in order 
to prevent false rumors from spreading. 
(Rogozinski, p. A15) 
Rogozinski also noted the importance of 
confidence in the economic environment. A 
stable economic climate is needed in order to 
persuade investors that the investment they are 
undertaking is secure. For example, Mexican 
de Aviacion(Aeromexico) did not receive any 
offers above the minimum when its sale was 
first announced. However, soon after the for-
eign debt renegotiation package was signed, 
four bids above the minimum were received. 
(Rogozinski, p. A15) 
Lastly, he stressed that it is critical to 
screen investors to ensure that they have the 
financial resources as well as the qualifications 
to run the company efficiently and effectively. 
The Mexican Privatization Committee reorga-
nized the sales process after the privatization 
program began in order to more effectively 
screen buyers. It now separates the process into 
two stages. In the first stage, potential investors 
are investigated so that those without the nec-
essary qualifications are immediately eliminat-
ed. Companies are analyzed for ability to pay, in 
addition to ability to effectively manage the 
company being sold. This allows the adminis-
tration to focus solely on price during the sec-
ond stage. (Rogozinski, p. A15) 
Additional Changes Needed to 
Complete Economic Liberalization 
In addition to the privatization of govern-
ment-owned enterprises, Mexico must initiate 
other major changes in order to induce stable 
economic conditions and hence attract invest-
ment. Trade liberalization must be extended 
even further to allow for the free flow of imports 
and exports in Mexico. It is important to real-
ize that many significant changes have already 
been initiated to open up Mexico's closed econ-
omy. For example, President de la Madrid elim-
inated the requirement of import licenses for 
some items, although licenses are still required 
for many other goods. Since 1986 there has 
been a dramatic reduction in tariffs, which have 
fallen from an average of 28.5 percent in 1985 
to an average of 12.5 percent in 1990.(Nogues 
and Gulati, p. 7) In 1986 Mexico joined GATT, 
the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, 
revealing its commitment to a freer trade poli-
cy. The signing of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement(NAFTA) will complete 
Mexico's efforts to further liberalize trade. 
Trade liberalization and the reduction of 
state ownership of commercial enterprises are 
just two policy areas that have witnessed sub-
stantial structural reform since 1982. Other 
areas include tax reform, reform of the finan-
cial system, agricultural reform, and stricter 
environmental laws. However, additional 
reforms are still needed. In particular, restric-
tions on foreign ownership in the financial sec-
tor need to be eased in order to allow Mexico to 
reap the benefits such investment can provide. 
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Not only does foreign ownership improve access 
to technology and management advances, but 
it provides needed financing as well. 
Commercial banks currently allow foreigners 
no more than thirty percent participation in 
ownership. The NAFTA addresses this issue, 
and provides for a gradual easing of restrictions 
for foreign ownership. The NAFTA has also 
given special attention to environmental prob-
lems in the U.S. Mexican border area as well as 
to problems that will result from liberalized 
agricultural trade practices. 
Conclusion 
The Mexican government has executed an 
immensely successful privatization program. 
The program's success has been demonstrated 
by the fact that 86 percent of the companies pri-
vatized were sold either at or above the asking 
price. The proceeds from these sales have 
helped to substantially reduce the public debt. 
Another important result of the privatizations 
is that efficiency has risen at the majority of the 
divested firms. This increased efficiency will 
help Mexico's once poorly managed state owned 
enterprises become more competitive in inter-
national markets. 
Finally, the privatization program has also 
been accompanied by financial reform and trade 
liberalization. Together these fundamental 
changes in the economic structure of Mexico 
have induced stabilization in the macroeco-
nomic environment. Inflation rates and inter-
est rates have both subsided, thus making 
Mexico more attractive to both domestic and 
foreign investors. Increased investment, of 
course, is the key which will eventually yield 
greater growth for the Mexican economy as a 
whole. 
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